Opinion: A different Tawang clash
The China-India border clash this time must be seen in the current geopolitical and strategic context.
By Major General SB Asthana
Hyderabad: The China-India LAC faceoff near Yangtse of the Tawang sector on December 9 is neither the first nor the last, but the clash resulting in injuries to soldiers on either side shows increasing aggressiveness and violent attempt to enforce own perception of the LAC by both sides.
Post the Galwan clashes in 2020, the Indian side is not surprised by the irresponsible behaviour of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has junked all old agreements for peace and tranquillity. Hence the Indian troops resolutely and firmly contested the PLA’s effort to close in to the LAC near Yangtse presumably to change the status quo.
Although both sides immediately disengaged from the area, and held a Flag Meeting in accordance with structured mechanisms to diffuse the situation, such repeated attempts in future are possible and will have to be responded to proactively, resolutely and firmly each time, as demonstrated now.
What makes the border issue between China-India complex? The People’s Republic of China (PRC) refused to ratify the Simla Agreement of 1914, signed between British India and Tibet, initialled by a Chinese representative. The Indian stance on the border generally follows Johnson Line (1865) in Ladakh and the McMahon Line in the east. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession, Aksai Chin was part of it; hence it rightfully belonged to India. India should have compelled China to accept the Simla Agreement before recognising Tibet as part of the PRC. There is, therefore, no mutually agreed border treaty between Independent India and the PRC.
China refuses to accept any treaty signed with Tibet or earlier than annexation when it does not suit it, and selectively refers to them when it suits its interests, as it referred to a Treaty of 1890 during the Doklam crisis which seemed advantageous to it despite the fact that it was superseded by many other treaties later.
LAC and Complex Management
Both countries have their own perception of the LAC and in certain areas, these perception overlap (like Tawang, Pangong Tso). As the LAC is not demarcated, the Chinese use non-demarcation as an opportunity to pursue its ‘Strategy of Incremental Encroachment’ by laying fresh claims (Arunachal Pradesh) and following it up with troops buildup/infrastructure development till resisted, and stops just short of conflict.
An opposing action/build-up by the Indian forces leads to a ‘faceoff/standoff’ each time. To avoid accidental triggers both sides have been resorting to measures short of live firing to prevent the other side from violating its perception of LAC, which is increasingly getting converted into violent clashes.
Current Standoff
Transgressions, patrol clashes, faceoffs and flag meetings to resolve it has been a common feature and will continue to be so till the LAC is demarcated. The current faceoff in Tawang is somewhat different than the earlier ones for many reasons if seen in the current geopolitical and strategic context as below:
* Chinese President Xi Jinping may be attempting to stoke nationalistic fervour out of his aggressive nationalistic stance by playing the victim card to divert domestic discontent due to Zero Covid policy, downslide in Chinese economy etc.
* Aggressive stance in Ladakh and Taiwan and its Chinese-doctored narrative suited Xi in consolidating his position as a strong leader to secure a third term. Hence he would like to continue with it further.
* Unhappy with the fastest-growing economy, a faceoff in winter may activate political debate in democratic India, and the Indian government may be compelled to deploy more troops throughout winter in all sectors, thereby increasing the financial cost for India by LOCisation of LAC.
* An attempt to test Indian response on the eastern borders after India has committed large amounts of troops in Ladakh and Kashmir.
* The strategic and cultural relevance of Tawang is coming to the forefront as the time for nomination of the next Dalai Lama is approaching. Tawang monastery has been the seat of cultural power and the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama.
* Yangtse area has a tough approach from the Indian side and is relatively more isolated in winter; hence the Chinese could have thought of taking a chance with an intrusion there.
* China enjoyed gross asymmetry in infrastructure development in its favour for too long and is not comfortable with Indian effort to catch up in this regard. Hence disruption in development activities along borders suits its design.
Looking Beyond
A change in mindset is required, from being reactive to being proactive with additional intelligence, surveillance and offensive capability to demonstrate the capacity to encroach into Chinese sensitive areas, in the absence of which China has assumed no threat from India.
If the Chinese have passed a Border Defence Law, India too should pass some laws to facilitate emphatic border construction and extend schemes under the Border Infrastructure Management Authority as near as the LAC as is practically feasible.
India must continue capacity building in all domains, including maritime, where Chinese vulnerable sea lines of communications can be threatened. Besides ongoing infrastructure development along borders, the scope of the Border Area Management Programme needs to be enhanced.
It is recommended that the States/UT along the LAC should allot concessional land to security forces like regional Scouts, ITBP, Sashastra Seema Bal, and families hailing from that area (on the son of soil concept), ready to settle in villages so constructed, along own perception of the LAC. This will improve inclusive growth, integration, besides proof of our claims on the border to ward off Chinese design of developing hundreds of new villages along the LAC.
Strategic partnerships with like-minded democracies and collective naval posturing to create a multi-front situation for China are efforts which should continue. There is a need for an alternative supply chain, trade and technological ecosystem, independent of China for which some initial steps taken by Quad countries need to be pursued
