Russia’s most dangerous course of action in the next phase of war
The British Army teaches that when grappling with the thorny issue of what a resourceful, capable and adaptable enemy is going to do, two extremes of action should be planned for: the Most Likely Course Of Action and the Most Dangerous (MLCOA and MDCOA).
The wave that eventually breaks upon you is likely to be somewhere in the middle of these two scenarios.
To be right is not the point. Instead, the process of examining one’s vulnerabilities and an enemy’s desires from every angle – including the enemy’s – should allow a commander and military staff to foresee problems before they occur – and have a plan up their sleeves for each potential scenario just in case.
So, how might such an exercise look one year into the Ukraine war, from Kyiv’s and Moscow’s perspectives?
The Russian assessment
Ukraine is currently focused on getting thousands of troops trained on the new Western tanks, artillery, air defence systems and other equipment pledged to them.
This training is mostly taking place outside the country, however, and it will be many weeks before Ukraine can put a ‘combined arms’ army in the field – one where all the component parts work together, rather than just coexist.
Ukraine’s Most Likely Course Of Action
Hold the existing front line for as long as it takes to get its new fully trained force into the country and in a position to punch through the Russian lines.
In the meantime, exploit opportunistic counter attacks where possible without becoming over-extended or decisively engaged.
Ukraine’s Most Dangerous Course Of Action
Push through Russian defences, heading south-east towards the coast around the city of Berdyansk.
This would split the Russian force in two: one in the Donbas and one in and just north of Crimea.
It would sever Vladimir Putin’s land corridor to Crimea, placing unsustainable strain on the Kerch bridge (only opened to road traffic this week after a blast last October – the rail line is still not in use) as the only means of resupplying troops in Crimea.
The Ukrainian assessment
Putin also badly needs to re-equip his forces with hardware – but he has had less international assistance. Some of the tanks and artillery pieces he has increasingly relied on in recent months are 50 years old and extremely vulnerable to modern weapons.
He also needs more manpower – his largely untrained army of mobilised men is assessed to be losing around 1,000 casualties (dead, wounded, missing and captured) a day while around 500,000 military-age men have left the country to avoid the war.
Russia’s Most Likely Course Of Action
Continue (quietly) to mobilise at home and press on with ‘human wave’ tactics that are inching out gains, albeit at tremendous cost, hoping that sheer strength of numbers will overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders, forcing Kyiv to negotiate from a position of weakness.
Russia’s Most Dangerous Course Of Action
Establish reliable and plentiful resupplies of ammunition and equipment from China, Iran and North Korea in order to produce an army that can drive forward with modern equipment.
